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Regulation of Competition in the "New" Free
Markets of Eastern Europe: A Comparative
Study of Antitrust Laws in Poland,
Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics,
and Their Models
Roger W. Mastalirt
Soon after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the
countries of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia enacted laws pro-
tecting competition to facilitate the transition to market economies
and to ensure the health and stability of those markets in the future.'
The passage of this new battery of antitrust laws roughly coincided with
the centennial in the United States of the Sherman Act,2 probably the
world's most aggressive antitrust law. 3 One of the goals of the nations
with "new" market economies was to seek integration into the eco-
nomic system of Europe and the world.4 Not surprisingly, then, the
governments of Eastern Europe turned to both the United States and
Europe as models in the formulation and implementation of their anti-
trust laws and enforcement policies.5 Western nations were prompt to
offer their assistance as midwives to the birth of new market
economies.
This Article examines what came out of that process of coopera-
t LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, University of Iowa College of Law, May
1992;J.D., Iowa, August 1991; M.A. in Music, Queen's College, Oxford University,June 1986;
B.M. in Music Performance, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, December 1980. The author
wishes to thank the Ford Foundation for providing the financial resources that made re-
search for this article possible.
I Poland became the first of Eastern Europe's new free markets to enact laws regulat-
ing competition with the Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices of January 1990.
Hungary also enacted an antitrust law in 1990, but not until November. Czechoslovakia fol-
lowed with its Act on Protection of Economic Competition dated January 30, 1991. See, e.g.,
Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1550, at 97, 104 (Jan. 30, 1992).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
3 Experts Find Sherman Act Vital to U.S., Copied by Others, on Centennial Celebration, 58 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 999 (June 28, 1990).
4 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 115. See also EC Antitrust Rules Incorporated into Eastern Cooperation Agreements, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1544, at 686 (Dec. 5, 1991).
5 On the coincidence of the centennial of the Sherman Act and the exportation of
U.S. antitrust law to Eastern Europe, see, e.g., id.
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tion and modelling. Part I describes the exchange of expertise be-
tween the West and Eastern Europe that led to the promulgation of
the new antitrust laws. As points of departure, Section I also briefly
surveys and compares the most significant features of United States
and EC antitrust laws. Part II examines in some detail Poland's new
law on regulation of economic competition, placing the new law in its
historical context, examining its provisions and policy, and the func-
tions of its enforcement agency. Part III compares the new Polish anti-
trust law with those of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Part IV assesses
the new antitrust laws of the three Eastern European countries in
terms of their fit with the legal history and culture of the countries,
and their effectiveness for markets in transition from central planning
to competitive conditions. Throughout the Article there is some em-
phasis on merger and market concentration, 6 rather than restrictive
practices, 7 because Eastern European countries are trying to eliminate
monopolistic concentration, while the West is trying to prevent it.
I. The United States and the European Economic Community as
Models for Antitrust Regulation in Eastern Europe
A. Assistance with Formulation and Implementation of Laws and
Policies
The initiative for Western assistance with the formulation and im-
plementation of Eastern European antitrust law developed on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean.8 The assistance of the United States took
several forms, described in some detail below. American experts can
point to our own history for examples of large-scale demonopolization,
so the need to restore competition to Eastern European economies
was similar to that of the United States almost one hundred years ago
when the Sherman Act was passed. 9 The desire to develop trade and
investment relations with the United States made the U.S. antitrust
6 Merger and market concentration are addressed in Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), in its prohibition of"[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." Id.
7 Restrictive practices are defined in the Clayton Act, §§ 2-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
8 See, e.g., Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement,
supra note 1, at 104.
9 Polish Enterprises Should Have No Fear of U.S. Antitrust Enforcers, Rill Says, 58 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1466, at 775 (May 17, 1990) (paraphrasing Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney General James F. Rill, a participant in the United States-Poland Joint Legal Seminar on
antitrust law in Warsaw in the spring of 1990). Rill was probably exaggerating the extent of
monopolies in the United States in the 1890s. Trusts in most of the products of heavy indus-
try and various consumer products caused prices of these goods to remain fairly stable while
farmers' prices for agricultural products fell. Nonetheless, the degree of monopolization in
the United States never reached 99% of business as it did in Eastern Block countries on the
eve of the great change to free markets. For discussions of the extent of trusts in the United
States in the 1890s, see WILLIAM LETWIN, LAw AND ECONOMIC PoUcv IN AMERICA: Ti-m EVOLU-
TION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr 53-99 (1965), and A.D. NEAT P, THE ANTrRUST LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY LAw 12 (2d ed.
1970).
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laws a logical model for Eastern European states. For example, Hun-
gary had an antitrust law dating from 1985 on the books, but found
that two provisions, those on trade restrictions and dominant position,
were not strict enough to move Hungary toward a competitive market
economy. Hungary therefore carried out a comparative study of laws
and policies in the West.10
The Antitrust Division of the U.S.Justice Department and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission used ajoint $7.2 million grant, received in May
1991 from the Agency for International Development, primarily to es-
tablish two-person lawyer/economist teams to assist Poland and the
former Czechoslovakia in developing antitrust enforcement pro-
grams." A short-term mission to Hungary also was launched in early
1992 with the goal of assessing needs for future long-term assistance.12
United States officials attended a conference in October 1991 spon-
sored by Czechoslovakia, and a Czech official visited the United States
in November 1991.13 ProfessorJanusz A. Ordover of New York Univer-
sity's Department of Economics, advisor to the Polish Anti-Monopoly
Office, "characterized the contributions of the Antitrust Division and
the FTC as 'very important. '14
The U.S. assistance has not been an attempt to make Eastern Eu-
rope swallow U.S. antitrust law whole. 15 Instead, U.S. antitrust enforce-
ment officials have offered guidance on how an investigation should
be run and on how markets operate. 16 They have also been valuable in
redirecting the focus of the Polish antitrust office, which at first con-
centrated on vertical restraints rather than horizontal concentration.'
7
The earlier orientation of the Polish antitrust office probably resulted
from a long history of officially sanctioned horizontal monopolies.
United States assistance in Eastern Europe has also stressed the impor-
tance of several issues, including developing microeconomic and com-
petition policy, practical matters of establishing enforcement agencies,
conducting investigations, and selection of criminal sanctions.' 8 To-
ward this end, the United States has provided the advice of operating
10 Tougher Competition Laws are on Agenda for Poland, Hungary, 57 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1438, at 573 (Oct. 26, 1989).
11 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 104.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Experts Foresee Increased Enforcement by Federal, State, Foreign Authorities, 60 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1507, at 364, 368 (Mar. 14, 1991).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. The assistance of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, FrC, and addi-
tionally of the Commerce Department in assisting Eastern European countries in the formu-
lation and implementation of new antitrust laws is discussed further in Wendell L. Willkie II,
Antitrust Goes Internationa4 59 ANrrrusr L.J. 563 (1991).
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
experts from the Antitrust Division and the FTC.1 9
Offers of cooperation from U.S. governmental units have been
supplemented by help from the American Bar Association (ABA) Sec-
tion on Antitrust Law, which also moved to provide continuing assist-
ance to Poland and other Eastern European countries. 20 On
December 10, 1990, the ABA announced "formation of a Special Com-
mittee on International Antitrust, which [has studied and recom-
mended] ways to eliminate gaps in the competition law enforcement
regimes of current and potential major trading nations."2 1 In June
1990, the ABA Board of Governors established the Central and East
European Law Initiative (CEELI) to assist Eastern European countries
in comprehensive legal reform. In January 1991, "Bulgaria submitted
to CEELI a draft antitrust law for comments and guidance. CEELI in-
vited the comments of the ABA Antitrust Section, among others."22 A
task force was appointed to examine the Bulgarian law, and its com-
ments were transmitted to the Bulgarian officials.23 Those comments
went far beyond suggestions for statutory language. They suggested
modes and principles for interpretation, some of which can be carried
out by implementing regulations and administrative interpretation.
24
On May 3, 1991, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted its antitrust law.2 5
The Eastern Europeans, for their part, have sought Western assist-
ance in reconstructing competitive market economies. Poland has
contacted the United States, the EC, Germany, and the World Bank to
tap their experience with regulation of competition. 26 The president
of the Polish Anti-Monopoly Office likened the process to learning a
new alphabet.27 While Western experts could not understand how the
socialist economy functioned, Eastern Europeans, on the other hand,
did not understand things that seemed obvious to experts from market
economies but were a mystery to those emerging from central
planning.28
Poland and the other Eastern European countries have displayed
a stronger leaning towards the EC model in their laws, because of their
19 Id.
20 ABA Section Forms International Committee Aimed at Creating Antitrust Harmonization, 59
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1496, at 904 (Dec. 20, 1990).
21 Id.
22 Eleanor Fox, Competition Policy and Eastern Europe: The Bulgarian Project as a Case Study,
60 ANurrrusT L.J. 243 (Apr. 10, 1991).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Anti-Monopoly Office, Bus. NEws FROM POL., Aug. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BNP File. See also Grzegorz Cydejko, Anti-Monopoly Office, THE WARSAw VoicE, Jan.
20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WRSAWV File.
27 Grzegorz Gorny, Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, President ofthe Anti-Monopoly Office: We
are Learning our Alphabet, GAZETA INT'L (Andre Yaffle trans.), June 28, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gazeta File.
28 Id.
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aspirations to join the Common Market.29 The Treaty of Rome con-
tains two articles, Articles 85 and 86, prohibiting conspiracy in restraint
of trade and abuse of dominant position in the market. Poland has
written the same provisions into its new antitrust legislation. 0 Poland
wanted to adapt to its own economy all regulations that might be prac-
ticable in Poland.31 Investors coming to Poland from Western Europe
would thus benefit from a familiar legal environment.3 2 The integra-
tion of Eastern European countries into the EC has gone slowly, how-
ever, because of the limits of manpower available to the EC, fears that
the disorderly economies of the emerging countries might become a
breeding ground for unacceptable business practices, and a general
lack of knowledge by each side of the other.33
One further source of assistance to Poland and the other emerg-
ing market economies has been the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD). In 1990, the OECD created a
Center for Cooperation with Eastern European Economies in Transi-
tion (CCEET). It brings Central and East Europeans (and Soviets) to-
gether with OECD experts who provide technical and policy advice in
all market-oriented areas of structural reform, including competition
policy. 34 In this context of foreign guidance and assistance, Eastern
European countries have promulgated and are learning to implement
laws regulating competition.
B. The Provisions of United States and EC Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws of the United States and the European Eco-
nomic Community address almost identical groups of anti-competitive
29 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 105. See also ECAntitrust Rules Incorporated into Eastern Cooperation Agreements, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1544, at 686 (Dec. 5, 1991) (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Po-
land agreed to accept EC competition policy as well as provisions in their laws). But see Steiger
Finds US. Has Responsibility to Help New Markets in Eastern Europe, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1473, at 24, 25 (July 5, 1990) (FTC head suggested that the United States
and EC member states are following increasingly similar competition policies. "The EC's
'dominant power' test is similar to the 'create or enhance market power' test used here.
Both analyses rest on an assessment of whether a joint venture or firm subsequent to a
merger will have the ability to raise prices individually or significantly increase the chances of
collusive behavior among the remaining competitive entities.").
30 Competition Rather Than Tariff. Interview with Anna Fornalzyk, Head of Anti-Monopoly
Office, RZECZPOSPOLITA No. 289, Dec. 12, 1991, reprinted in PotasH NEws BuLL., Dec. 17, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. Anna Fornalczyk commented that Westerners "do not know us well enough....
Often our interlocutors were surprised to find out we were acquainted with economic theo-
ries, or that we had a legal system." Id. The integration of Polish law with EC law was eventu-
ally achieved. See EC Antitrust Rules Incorporated into Eastern Cooperation Agreemen ts, supra note
4.
34 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, RESOURCE GUIDE TO DOING BusiNEss IN CENTRAL AND EAsTERN
EUROPE (1991), available in LEXIS, GENFED Library, DSTATE File.
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practices and combinations. 35 They do so, however, in slightly differ-
ent ways and with different criteria of assessment and means of
enforcement. 36
Whereas the antitrust laws of the United States aim for maximum
diffusion of competition, the policy behind EC law is diffusion of com-
petitive power tempered by cooperation to enhance world competitive-
ness.37 With their differing policies, the two laws establish different
sets of remedies: U.S. antitrust law is essentially 'structuralist' in that it
relies on dismemberment of monopolies, and imposition of treble
damages in private suits; EC antitrust law sees regulation of obnoxious
behavior, rather than dismemberment of offenders, as the appropriate
remedy.38 The rules regulating competition are usually drafted in
35 In the United States, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, seeks to "protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." 15 U.S.C. § 12(a). Section 1 prohib-
its conspiracies, contracts, and combinations in restraint of trade among states or with for-
eign states with criminal sanctions; Section 2 makes it a felony to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce"; Section 3 prohibits every contract, combination, or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade in or between territories or between territories and foreign states;
Section 6a exempts "conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or im-
port commerce) with foreign nations" unless there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable" effect on domestic commerce. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, supple-
ments the Sherman Act. Section 13(a) prohibits direct and indirect price discrimination
between different purchasers of similar commodities "where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" unless reasonable,
or approved by the FTC; Section 13a prohibits so-called "tying" arrangements; Section 15(a)
grants the right of suit by private claimants injured by anti-competitive practices; Section 18
allows the FTC to prevent the creation of monopolies by mergers.
In the EC, antitrust law is founded on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) TREAv ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC CoMmUNI [EEC TREATY] arts 85-86. Article 85 prohibits "all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which" fix prices, control production, share markets, discriminate among trading parties, or
use tying arrangements. Article 86 prohibits "[a] ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it...."
See also Hans van Houtte, European Economic Community Antitrust Regulations: Council
Regulation No. 17/62 and Commission Regulation No. 2 7/62: Introduction and Bibliography, 2 BA-
sic DOCUMENTS INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1990).
Articles 85 and 86 contain only general principles. The framework and modali-
ties for their application by the Commission had to be fixed by the Council of
Ministers pursuant to Article 87. Council Regulation 17/62, adopted by the
Council of Ministers on February 6, 1962, was the first text to do so. It enabled
and provided the legal framework for the Commission to enforce Articles 85
and 86. Council Regulation 17/62 is directly applicable in the Member-States,
that is, it binds individual persons and companies and can be invoked by or
against them before national courts.
Id. The Text of the Regulations may be found at 2 BAsic DOCUMENTS INT'L ECON. L. 183
(1990).
36 Another succinct comparison of the antitrust laws and policies of the United States
and the European Economic Community may be found in D. AUDRETSCH, THE MARKET AND
THE STATE 57-66 (1989).
37 AUDRETSCH, supra note 36, at 58-61.
38 Id.
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terms of per se illegality, although their application is currently much
tempered by a 'rule of reason,' or case-by-case assessment of the eco-
nomic benefits or detriments of alleged anticompetitive activity.39 The
rule of reason is the statutory and practical standard in EC antitrust
law.40
Antitrust enforcement in the United States is tripartite. The Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department is primarily responsible for
finding and prosecuting violators of the law.4 1 Private claims of anti-
trust violations may be brought by individuals and enterprises harmed
by anticompetitive practices, with the special incentive of treble dam-
ages for the victorious plaintiff.42 Although it has enforcement pow-
ers, the task of the Federal Trade Commission is primarily prevention:
it is involved in screening, approving, or barring mergers and practices
before they are completed.43
In the EC there is but one agency involved in enforcement. The
EC Commission both screens prospective actions and seeks out viola-
tors.44 There is no provision for private suit in the EC system.45 Ap-
peal from decisions of the Commission may be had to the European
Court of Justice.
The United States and the EC differ in their treatment of antitrust
violations as well, although the same set of practices or conditions is
39 The U.S. laws state that the identified practices are "prohibited." Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
40 The EC provisions all require that the identified practices be "incompatible with the
common market in so far as they affect trade between Member States," and in the case of
Article 85, "have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market."
41 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4.
42 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
43 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988), and amendments to
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, & 19 (1988), charging the FTC with preventing and
eliminating unlawful tying contracts, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking
directorates.
The role of the FIC in preventing anticompetitive mergers and other practices, as well
as FTC assistance to Eastern Europe in the formulation and implementation of antitrust reg-
ulations, is discussed by Janet D. Steiger, Chairman of the FTC, in Report from Officialdom: 60
Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 60 AN'rrrusr
L.J. 177 (1991).
44 SeeVALENTnee KoRAn & WARwicK A. RoTHNm, AN INTRODUCroRY GuIDE TO EEC COM-
PETrION LAW AND PRAcnrcE 15 (4th ed. 1990). The Commission is empowered by Regulation
17 to decide whether conduct infringes Article 85 or 86 and to grant individual exemptions.
Id.
45 Willkie, supra note 18.
[A] large distinction is that the EEC competition policy provides for no private
treble damage actions or no private enforcement as such. Few realize that in
American antitrust enforcement private treble damage actions constitute ap-
proximately 95 percent of all antitrust cases, so that the distinction is rather
dramatic. In coming years, the antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Rome may
become the subject of private litigation in Europe. Private parties may invoke
the treaty in their own national courts in litigation-as a defense, for example,
to the enforcement of contracts, and in the future, perhaps, as creating com-
mercial torts deriving from the provisions of the treaty.
68 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 19
suspect in each system. Dominant market power is a key measure of mo-
nopolist activity in each system. Under U.S. antitrust law, attainment
of a monopoly is illegal; market share is a primary factor in assessing
attainment of monopoly. The share of the market is tailored to each
sector of the economy, but the rule of thumb is that combinations or
companies in excess of a thirty percent market share have attained ille-
gal monopoly. 46 Seeking monopoly is also suspect, although no longer
illegal per se, in the United States. Under EC law, abuse of monopoly,
but not attaining monopoly, is illegal. 47 A monopoly firm must act in a
monopolistic fashion to come under sanction. A relatively high mar-
ket share, forty percent as a rule of thumb, is required to be suspect.48
Agreements in restraint of trade, such as horizontal price fixing and
quantity agreements, are illegal per se under U.S. law, but treated
under a rule of reason by the EC. The practical effect of the two ap-
proaches is very similar, however. 49 Under EC law, cartels of low total
market share are permitted, and there is some preference for a single
firm with a large market share to combinations of smaller firms with a
large market share.50 Vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing, are
treated somewhat differently under the two systems. They are illegal
per se under U.S. law, but prohibited only when they present market
barriers in the EC.5 1
Finally, horizontal mergers are always suspect, and monopolistic
ones are nearly per se illegal under U.S. law. Mergers may be pre-
vented on the basis of possible future reduction of competition. In the
EC, mergers short of monopoly are beyond the jurisdiction of the
Commission.52 Mergers are tested by the same standards of market
46 The United States Supreme Court held that a 30% post-merger share triggers a pre-
sumption of illegality in United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). How-
ever, the previous year the Court stated that market share must be considered "within an
industry framework." Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962).
More recently the Court has held that market share must be examined in light of the "struc-
ture, history, and probable future" of the particular market. Accord United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (sustaining lower court's finding that 23.2% of the
market would cause no substantial lessening of competition). But see R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v.
Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding illegal 84% share in post-acquisition
market).
47 See EEC TREATY art. 85.
48 John Cook & Trevor Soames, EEC Merger Regulation II. The Appraisal Process, 19 Irr'L
Bus. LAw. 491, 493 (1991) [hereinafter Cook & Soames II]. See also John Cook & Trevor
Soames, EEC Merger Regulation: A Practical View, 19 ITr'L. Bus. LAw. 330-35 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Cook & Soames I], which explains that market dominance in the EC is measured by a
formula of market concentration and actual control of a market with a Community
dimension.
49 AUDRETSCH, supra note 36, at 62.
50 Kenneth D. George & Caroline Joll, The Legal Framework, in COMPETITION POuCY IN
THE UK AND EEC 20 (Kenneth D. George & Caroline Joll eds., 1975).
51 AUDRETSCH, supra note 36, at 63.
52 Id. at 64. See also George &Joll, supra note 50, at 29, as to the lenience of EC law in
comparison to U.S. antitrust laws, "which lay down 'guidelines' specifying structural changes,
i.e. certain increases in market share which are presumed illegal." Id.
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share as are agreements in restraint of trade in respective systems.53
H. Regulation of Competition in Poland
Poland became the first of Eastern Europe's new free markets to
enact laws regulating competition with the Law on Counteracting Mo-
nopolistic Practices of February 24, 1990 (Polish Antitrust Law or Mo-
nopolistic Practices Act). 54 In April 1990 the Polish government
established an independent Anti-Monopoly Office that reports directly
to the Council of Ministers. The Polish Antitrust Law and the Anti-
Monopoly Office are part of the Polish government's campaign to
strengthen, through legislation and other acts, its power actively to
pursue industrial deconcentration (where this is appropriate) and to
take action against behavior and practices that effectively restrict com-
petition.55 In preparing the new law, and in developing policy and
enforcement practice, Poland has called upon antitrust specialists in
both the United States and the EC.56 To understand the context and
content of the new Polish antitrust law, it is essential to understand
something of the history of regulation of competition in Poland since
World War I.
A. The History of Regulation of Competition in Poland
1. The Period Between the Wars
Poland bore only a passing resemblance to a market economy dur-
ing the time of its independence between the world wars because of
the impact of an increasing number of cartels.57 Cartelization was fos-
tered, partly by government policy, in an attempt to expand exports by
various subsidy arrangements at the expense of the domestic market.
Industry became highly cartelized, forcing the internal prices above
competitive levels and reducing output accordingly.58 From 1919 to
1939, cartels increased in number and power, despite attempts at gov-
ernment regulation. In 1919 there were only nine cartels; by 1929
53 Cook & Soames II, supra note 48, at 493.
54 Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices of February 24, 1990. For the sake of
comparison, it may be useful to keep in mind that the Polish economy, although far more
concentrated than the U.S. economy, is also much smaller. The gross domestic product for
the United States in 1991, measured in constant 1987 dollars, was $4.85 trillion. &e NEWSDAY,
Apr. 5, 1992, at 7 (quoting Commerce Department figures). The gross domestic product for
Poland for 1991 was estimated at 549.5 billion zlotys, or about $ 91.6 million. See Marek
Misiak, Interview with Professor Leszek Zienkowski, Director of GUS and PANJoint Division for Statisti-
cal and Economic Research, ZYCIE GosPoDARCZE No. 41, Oct 13, 1991, reprinted in POUSH NEWS
BuLL., Oct. 15, 1991.
55 Memorandum of Development Policy, Bus. NEws FROM POL., Aug. 31, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNP File.
56 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 104"05.
57 JOHN M. MONT-AS, CENTRAL PLANNING IN POLAND, YALE STUDIES IN ECONOMICS 13, 50
(1962).
58 THAD P. ALTON, POUSH POSTWAR ECONOMY 12 (1955).
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there were one hundred controlling nearly forty percent of industrial
production; by 1936 there were two hundred sixty-six. 59 By 1938 it was
estimated that cartelized production accounted for two-thirds of the
total industrial output and for about seventy-five percent of the pro-
duction of large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises. 60
Cartelization occurred with such force in Poland as a result of sev-
eral factors: ownership or control of many industries was concen-
trated; protective tariffs gave these industries price protection; great
differences in the costs of production in various sectors of Poland
meant that the play of supply and demand would force some areas to
de-industrialize; a lack of investment funds created a barrier to market
entry; and restrictive regulations like quotas on imports and exports
made cartelization almost imperative in order to achieve compliance. 61
Cartels were therefore the result of an economy under stress. The gov-
ernment recognized that cartels could be the instruments of exploita-
tion, but it also perceived them as instruments of efficient economic
control, and as a source of political support.62
During the Depression, the government of independent Poland
finally took steps to regulate the monopolistic practices of cartels
under the pressure of public protest. The government's first attempt
to regulate cartels was the Cartel Law of March 28, 1933.63 Under the
Cartel Law, the government reviewed all agreements, resolutions, and
decisions aiming at control of production, prices, and conditions of
exchange of goods.64 Such agreements had to be registered with the
Ministry of Industry and Trade under penalty of substantial fine. 65
The real teeth of the law, however, were in the creation of a Cartel
Court in the Supreme Court of Justice.66 The Cartel Court had the
right, on the motion of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to dissolve
cartels or cancel their resolutions or decisions whenever they were con-
sidered harmful to the general prosperity, were dangerous from an
economic point of view, or created economically unjustifiable price
levels.67 Unfortunately, most of the cartels actually dissolved by the
Court were small, and the effect on prices was limited as prices of
cartelized items remained above the level for other articles.68
The second attempt to regulate the cartels was a stricter law en-
59 FERDYNAND ZWEIG, POLAND BETWEEN Two WARs: A CITICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CHANGES 102-03 (1944).
60 ZBIGNIEW LANDAU & JERzv TOMASZEWSKI, THE POLISH ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 124 (Wojciech Roszkowski trans., Groom Helm 1985).
61 ZWEIG, supra note 59, at 103.
62 Id. at 104.
63 ZWEIG, supra note 59 (citing the Polish Cartel Law of March 28, 1933).
64 Id. at 105.
65 Id.
6 Id.
67 Id.
68 LANDAU & TomSZEwSmu, supra note 60, at 92.
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acted in November 1935. Under the 1935 law, the Minister of Trade
and Industry was empowered to dissolve cartels without a hearing
before the Cartel Court.69 Before the end of that year, the minister
had dissolved ninety-three cartels out of two hundred and seventy-four
existing cartels, and several dozen more were terminated during the
next two years. 70 As a result, cartelized prices on goods such as sugar,
coal, kerosene, iron, and coke fell ten to twenty percent by 1938, but
remained above prices for non-cartelized goods.71
2. The Communist Period
In light of the cartelization of industry in independent Poland, the
shift to central ownership and control of the Polish economy was not
as dramatic as it might otherwise have seemed. State monopoly re-
placed private monopoly in most industries. State ownership of enter-
prises was favored in the new constitution, and nationalization
proceeded quickly from 1949 to 1956.72 From 1944 to 1948 the Polish
economy was a mixed one, retaining some vestiges of private owner-
ship along side central control and ownership.7 From 1949 to 1956
nationalization occurred with great speed.74 In addition, during the
1940s and 1950s prices were fixed by the state. 75
The communist system in Poland underwent a crisis in 1956 when
peasants attempted to dismantle the collective agricultural system. Ag-
riculture remained partly decollectivized for the remainder of the
communist period. However, central control continued in the rest of
the Polish economy under the guise of free management rhetoric, ac-
cording to some commentators,76 or what others would call the "tradi-
tional" socialist planned economy.77 Poland followed most closely the
model of centrally planned economies that has been described as the
industrial association as a business corporation. "Under this model, the
industrial association becomes the basic unit of the plan-carrying appa-
ratus,"78 or the enterprise. The "former enterprises become divisions
or firms."79 The industrial association was expected to meet its targets
by free management. 80 In Poland, this model of central planning was
realized by organizing the economy into multi-departmental monopo-
69 Id. at 124.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 POLAND SINCE 1956, at 278 (Tadeusz N. Cieplak ed., 1972).
73 Andrzej Brzeski, Economic Reform In Poland. The Cautious Avant-Garde, in POLAND
SINcE 1956, supra note 72, at 292.
74 Cieplak, supra note 72, at 278.
75 MoNT s, supra note 57, at 199.
76 Brzeski, supra note 73, at 296-98.
7 7 JANusz G. ZIELINSKI, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN POLISH INDUSTRY 278-79 (1973).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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list enterprises administered by ministries and their branches.8 1 The
result of this traditional socialist economy was that in 1972 ninety-nine
percent of industry and commerce was state-owned and operated.8 2
A weakening of central regulatory functions began in the 1980s.83
The impetus for reform was a steep economic decline in 1982 and the
years following. The reforms included "de-centralization of decision-
making, improvement of the price structure" to be a more accurate
reflection of costs, and imposition of "greater financial discipline of
state enterprises."84 In its report on Poland in 1987, the World Bank
suggested that increasing development of market competition in Po-
land was essential.85 While steps towards a competitive market econ-
omy began in the early 1980s, the conditions by the early 1990s, when
free Poland began to formulate its competition policy, were far from
ideal for fostering a competitive market.
B. Conditions on the Eve of Launching a Market Economy in Poland
The Polish economy is facing two problems as it attempts to adjust
to market competition. First, it must demonopolize state-controlled
enterprises. Second, it must lay the groundwork to prevent future mo-
nopolization of the new private sector.86 On the eve of launching a
market economy, seventy percent of the products made in Poland were
manufactured by one or two enterprises, and such monopolies
amounted to more than twenty-five percent of all enterprises.8 7 Ninety
percent of Polish industry was state-owned.88 As of August 1991, the
Anti-Monopoly Office found that the degree of monopolization of Po-
lish industry was thirty-one percent with the heaviest monopolization
in durable goods.8 9 "With the degree of monopolization in a given
industry measured by the single largest domestic producer's share in
aggregate sales (only domestically made products are taken into ac-
count), many markets in Poland still feature a monopolistic structure.
This applies in particular to washing machines, passenger cars,
gramophones, vacuum cleaners, motorcycles (100%), deep freezers
(93.9%), refrigerators (89.3%), and bicycles (87.9%)."90
Concentration is not the only problem of Polish industry. Profes-
81 Cydejko, supra note 26.
82 Cieplak, supra note 72, at 277.83 j. Eysymontt, Reform in the Polish Economy, in POLAND: THE ECONOMY IN THE 1980s, at
38 (Roger Clarke ed., 1989).
84 Memorandum of Development Policy, supra note 55.
85 THE WORLD BANK, POLAND: REFORM, ADJUSTMENT, AND GROWrH 28 (1987).
86 Cydejko, supra note 26.
87 Id.
88 Zbigniew M. Slupinski, Law on Privatization of State-Owned Industries, 29 I.L.M. 1226,
1229 (1990).
89 Iwona Ryniewicz, Consumers Will Pay, 32 GAZETA BANKOWA 11-18 (1991), reprinted in
POLISH NEws BuLL., Aug. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
90 Id.
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sor Janusz A. Ordover of New York University's Department of Eco-
nomics, an advisor to the Polish Anti-Monopoly Office, noted that
Eastern European economies "have been designed to work as inef-
ficiently as possible," making the adjustment to a market economy a
difficult one entailing high unemployment and inflation.9 1 Ordover
noted that many monopolistic enterprises will simply go out of busi-
ness under their own weight before they can be demonopolized.9 2
Poland had no monopolies in the classical sense of the word be-
cause all Polish monopolies were administratively created. Nonethe-
less, monopolization of major sectors of the Polish economy is obvious.
The areas of the economy most in need of competition have been
trade and agriculture, though the latter was monopolized only at the
support levels in processing, banking, insurance, and services. 93
The Polish government determined to take a sectoral approach to
privatizing the state-controlled enterprises. 94 By August 1991, the gov-
ernment had liquidated 150 cooperative units at the national level,
and another 1000 at the regional level.9 5 Also, in a move criticized by
the constitutional tribunal, the government decided to forbid coopera-
tives from forming associations in an attempt to prevent the reappear-
ance of former state monopolies in private guise.9 6 In light of the
prevailing conditions, we may now turn to an examination of Polish
policy for regulating competition.
C. Polish Anti-Monopoly Policy
The thrust of Polish anti-monopoly policy is fostering competi-
tion, rather than policing prices or other monopolist behavior. Foster-
ing competition was second only to ending inflation as a goal of the
Polish government in late 1989.97 The primary goal of the new Anti-
Monopoly Office was not to become an antitrust police force, but to
foster competition.98 Efficiency and competitiveness were expected to
91 Experts Foresee Increased Enforcement by Federal, State, Foreign Authorities, 60 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1507, at 364, 368 (Mar. 14, 1991).
92 Id.
93 Corny, supra note 27. See also Anti-Monopoly OfftCe, Bus. NEws FROM POL., Aug. 31,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNP File. The observations on the state of monopo-
lies in Poland and the areas targeted for demonopolization were those of Anna Fornalczyk,
President of the Polish Anti-Monopoly Office.
" Krzysztof Fronczak, Sectoral Approach to Privatisation, ZYCIE GoSPODARCZE, Sept. 29,
1991, at 8, reprinted in POUSH NEWS BuLL., Sept. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
PNBUL File.
95 Government Committee Discusses Anti-Monopoly Programme, PAP NEWS WiRE, Apr. 8, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PAP File.
961&
97 Tougher Competition Laws Are on Agenda for Poland, supra note 10, at 573. The com-
ment was made by Ryszard Jacyno, director of the Antimonopoly Department at the Polish
Finance Ministry, the predecessor to the current Anti-Monopoly Office.
98 Economic Update, GAZETA INT'L, June 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gazeta
File. Anti-Monopoly Office President Anna Fornalczyk stated that her group did not want to
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be the gains of demonopolizing state-owned enterprises. 99 In the in-
terest of competitiveness, dismantling existing monopolies was to be
done with care so that the result was not simply smaller private-sector
monopolies. Competition was to be fostered by preventing barriers to
entry in the market. 10 Market entry was expected to be primarily lo-
cal, but either domestic or foreign market entry was to be welcomed as
long as customer satisfaction was the priority. 10 1
D. Polish Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices
The principal organ established by the Law on Counteracting Mo-
nopolistic Practices was the Anti-Monopoly Office, an independent
body that reports directly to the Council of Ministers. Its powers, func-
tions, and effectiveness will be examined in some detail below. First we
turn to the general provisions of the law.
1. Provisions of the Law
As mentioned above in part I.A., Poland has written into its Law
on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices provisions that are identical
to those found in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome prohibiting
conspiracy in restraint of trade and abuse of dominant position in the
market.10 2 The Polish law follows Western models in a number of
other respects as well, including the recognition of a thirty percent
market share as a dominant position, imposition of fines, and provi-
sions for investigation of monopolistic practices on the petition of
competitors or on the enforcement agency's own initiative.' 0 3
The law as drafted placed companies into three categories: those
with no competitors; those with a thirty percent market share or more;
and those that have used their power to distort competition. 10 4 Each
category is scrutinized to determine whether anticompetitive practices
or effects are apparent. 10 5 The law allowed for sanctions in the form of
fines of up to one percent of net profits for firms found to have en-
gaged in monopolistic practices. 10 6 The law also established the Anti-
Monopoly Office. 10 7 The activities of the privatization agency were to
be undertaken in cooperation with the Anti-Monopoly Office, which
could veto government privatization proposals, to ensure that ade-
become an antitrust police force, "but we shall do everything to promote competition and to
open our markets." Id.
99 Memorandum of Development Polity, supra note 55.
100 Corny, supra note 27.
101 Id.
102 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
103 Compare the discussion of provisions of the Polish Antitrust Law, infra, with the dis-
cussion of United States and EC antitrust laws and policies, supra, in part I.B.
104 Tougher Competition Laws Are on Agenda for Poland, Hungary, supra note 10.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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quate steps were taken to prevent former state monopolies from reap-
pearing as private ones. 108
The law addresses many of the anticompetitive practices tradition-
ally targeted by Americans and Europeans. Cartel agreements made
by competitors are subject to scrutiny' °9 as are acts combining manage-
ment functions in two or more competitive organizations or firms;110
this is particularly important with regard to state-owned enterprises
subject to winding up procedures under Article 37 of the Privatisation
Act, and to so-called parallel companies formed by state-owned enter-
prises to which all of the assets of the state-owned company are then
transferred. Acts of vertical and horizontal monopolization are also
defined in the Polish Antitrust Law.111 If found guilty of conspiracy in
restraint of trade or of obstructing the emergence of a competitive en-
vironment, firms are subjected to proceedings upon a motion by the
Anti-Monopoly Office. 1 2 Proceedings under this article of the Polish
Antitrust Law may result in the termination of the activity, fines, or
break-up of the monopoly."l 3
The law has already been amended slightly. Thirty percent mar-
ket share remained the threshold for break-up of firms and the largest
share allowed a privatized firm.1 4 However, other market-share
thresholds were altered. 1 5 The term "monopolist," applied to firms
with no effective competitors, and hence not allowed to privatize with-
out being broken up, was redefined as any firm whose market share
exceeds eighty percent, rather than ninety percent as had been re-
quired in the original law.' 16 Also, joint operation of two competing
companies that together control more than ten percent of the market
was defined as "monopolistic." 1 7 Money penalties were added for sup-
pliers of incorrect information. 118
2. The Anti-Monopoly Office
a. Powers
The Anti-Monopoly Office (AMO) is the principal policy, enforce-
108 Witold Modzelewski, Anti-Monopoly Law: First Anniversary, RZECZPOSpOLrrA No. 116,
May 20, 1991, reprinted in POLISH NEWS BuLL., May 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
PNBUL File.
109 Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices of February 24, 1990, art. 4, para. 2
[hereinafter Polish Monopolistic Act].
110 Polish Monopolistic Act, supra note 109, art. 4, para 1.4.
111 Polish Monopolistic Act, supra note 109, art. 7, para. 1.
112 Polish Monopolistic Act, supra note 109, art. 12.
113 Id.
114 War on Monopoly, GAZETA WyBORCZA No. 144, June 21, 1991, at 2, reprinted in POLISH
NEWS BuLL., June 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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ment, and educative body under the Monopolistic Practices Act.' 1 9 It
has wide-ranging powers to protect competition through the process of
privatization and to regulate competitive practice, in the emerging pri-
vate sector.120 Like American antitrust laws, the goal of the AMO is to
prevent monopolistic practices so as to protect consumers and other
enterprises.' 21 To this end, the AMO is empowered to influence merg-
ers, divide and create new enterprises, and provide for market entry of
new firms. These functions are known as "system shaping."122 The
AMO's regulatorj functions include regulating monopolistic practices
(dictating excessive prices, imposing inconvenient conditions in con-
tracts, and coercing agreements to curtail competition).' 23 The AMO
may also introduce price controls to the limited extent compatible with
controlling the power of monopolies and still allowing market forces
to work. 124
The AMO has been invested with broad powers, including the
power to break up enterprises and to ban company registrations. 12 5 In
its regulatory role, the AMO is also able to impose fines of up to fifteen
percent of the firm's revenue. The Anti-Monopoly Office also aims to
investigate phony cooperatives and other economic entities that still
function as monopolies, although masquerading as legitimate private-
sector associations.126 Price intervention is available to the AMO when
the prices result in excess profits.127
In its role as a system shaper, the AMO may break up firms con-
trolling more than thirty percent of the market (threshold of market
dominance), the same yardstick applied in U.S. law, and deny priva-
tization to an entity that would retain eighty percent of the relevant
market. 128 Under Article 11.2 of the Monopolistic Practices Act, state-
owned enterprises that want to be transformed into either a company
owned by the State Treasury or a one-person company should apply for
AMO approval of the privatization.' 29 The application must include a
list of competitors if the entity in question controls more than thirty
percent of the market, and a statement that no manager of the firm is
119 Anti-Monopoly Office, Bus. NEws FROM POL., Aug. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BNP File.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. Another excellent summary of the activities, areas of authority, and policy orien-
tation of the Anti-Monopoly Office may be found injaroslaw Wieczorkiewicz, The Anti-Monop-
oly Office and Competition Development Policy, THE WARSAW VOICE, Dec. 1, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WRSAWV File.
125 Economic Update, GAZETA INT'L, June 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gazeta
File.
126 Id.
127 Gorny, supra note 27.
128 Cydejko, supra note 26.
129 Anti-Monopoy Offe and Privatization, Bus. NEwS FROM POL., Mar. 8, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNP File.
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a member of a competing firm.130 Based on the information in the
application, the AMO may confirm or deny the privatization.131 The
first targets of the AMO for demonopolization were the trade and agri-
cultural distribution sectors of the economy.13 2
b. Educational Role
The AMO also has an educative function to perform as Poland
makes the transition to a competitive market economy.
Due to the unique post-communist economic system, the Anti-Monop-
oly Office cannot be seen as a typical antimonopoly agency. Its activi-
ties are seen as "essential" because of the need to implement market
ethics, attitudes and habits. Therefore, it is not enough to liquidate
monopolies to obtain smaller bodies which will comply with supply
and demand rules ([Poles] simply do not know [the rules of supply and
demand] and do not know how to apply them). The question is how
to teach them and change the mentality of each participant in this
system, from worker to general manager.
133
The AMO sets up meetings with entrepreneurs to show them how to
compete with the remaining cooperatives.1 3 4 The AMO also drafts
programs for revamping the economy, stimulating competition, and
terminating monopolies.135
c. The AMO in Operation: The FSO Case
Anyone adversely affected by the practices of a monopolist Polish
enterprise, even a foreign entrepreneur, can apply to the AMO to have
proceedings started against the enterprise.136 By late January 1991, the
AMO had already handed down thirty-nine decisions in such cases.137
A further twenty-two cases were underway at that time as the result of
the AMO acting on its own initiative. In its first seven months of work,
the AMO examined about 1,500 cases. 138 In early 1991,
the office was preparing a decision to divide the large Ursus tractor
factory, as well as a package of thirty-five other decisions relating to the
break-up of the State Grain Factory, which operates throughout the
country.13 9 The Grain Factory, which provides farmers with their
means of production and purchases grain from them, was being
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Memorandum of Development Policy, supra note 55.
133 Wieczorkiewicz, supra note 124.
134 Corny, supra note 27. The need for education of managers in the importance of
marketing skills and acquisition of new technologies to achieve and maintain competitiveness
is noted in Richard A. Jenner & Joseph Gappa, Learning Under Fire: The Adaptability of Polish
Managers to Competitive Madt Conditions, 25 J. WoRLD TRADE 81, 91 (1991).
135 KERM Discusses Anti-Monopoly Programme, PAP NEws WiRE, Apr. 8, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, PAP File.
156 Cydejko, supra note 26.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Wieczorkiewicz, supra note 124.
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sharply criticized in rural areas.14 0
The AMO has already encountered a diverse group of monopolis-
tic practices in the Polish economy. By late 199 1,"[t]he office [had] is-
sued nineteen decisions in connection with the practice of imposing
burdensome conditions on agreements, which bring about unjustifi-
able benefits. For instance, in car-sale agreements, the Pol-Mot com-
pany [was] ordered to stop imposing conditions which [did] not allow
buyers to choose the color they want."141 Four decisions dealt with
tying arrangements. 142 The AMO has also encountered agreements
that "involve restricting access to the market or eliminating any compe-
tition. The office has issued five decisions in this respect." 43 In three
cases of seeking to monopolize, "there was a restriction on the produc-
tion, buying or selling of goods, which [had] led to increased prices,"
giving each monopolist a dominant position in the market.144
The successes of the AMO have not gained as much attention,
however, as its most famous debacle, the FSO case. 145 Warsaw's auto-
mobile maker, FSO, which primarily makes cars under license from
Fiat of Italy and is the only manufacturer of mid-size cars in Poland,
was pushed to the brink of bankruptcy by actions of the AMO.' 4 6
Quality and production standards had fallen at FSO during the last
several decades, but FSO's monopoly position was protected by high
import duties on cars from the West.147 FSO was virtually the only
choice for Polish consumers. 48 The AMO examined several price in-
creases over a few months in 1990 on two car models built by FSO with
little change over the last ten to twenty years.' 4 9 These price changes
amounted to more than a twenty-five percent aggregate increase. 50
On October 5, 1990, AMO ordered FSO management to reestablish
the price of June of that year.' 5 ' The decision was to be executed at
once.'
5 2
Management of FSO refused to implement the decision on the
ground that it would spell immediate collapse for the car maker.' 53
Further, management argued, FSO was not acting like a monopolist.15 4
14 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
14 Id.
144 Id.
145 The FSO case is discussed in detail in Leszek Imijewski, FSO UnderPressure: Monopoly
onJunk, THE WARSAW VOICE, Oct. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WRSAWV File.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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It pointed to a slim 1.8% profit margin on one model at the allegedly
inflated price.155 At the price levels ordered by the AMO, the two
models would be produced in the red or at best without any profit at
al.1. 56 The rise in price implemented by FSO, the company claimed,
was necessitated by inflation, and the monopolist price increases of 350
to 400 percent on some components from some suppliers. 157 The
plant's trade union argued that the bankruptcy of FSO would have a
direct cost of 25,000 lostjobs (12,000 in Warsaw), and adversely affect
another 100,000 jobs in related plants.' 58 "Refusal to carry out the
[AMO] 's decision [was to have] cost FSO a 3 billion zlotys fine [$500,000
at the exchange rate in the fall of 1990]." In addition, it would have
cost the director six months' pay.159 The Anti-Monopoly Tribunal re-
versed the AMO decision on appeal by FSO in December 1990.16°
ml. A Brief Comparison with the Antitrust Laws of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia
Like Poland, Hungary enacted an antitrust law in 1990, but not
until November.' 61 Czechoslovakia followed with its Act on Protection
of Economic Competition on January 30, 1991.162 As with Poland's
antitrust law, the new laws of these two countries were designed to
make the transition from centrally planned economies to competitive
market economies and are modelled primarily on the antitrust law of
the EC.
A. Regulation of Competition in the Twentieth Century
Like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia saw the rise of cartels
along with the rise in industrialization from the late nineteenth cen-
tury into the twentieth century.163 In Hungary there were about one
hundred cartels before the outbreak of World War I. 64 Between the
wars the number rose rapidly, to about 150 in 1921, and to 357 by
1938.165 Banks often assisted in, and insisted on, the formation of car-
tels. 166 As in Poland, on the eve of World War II Hungarian cartels
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Cydejko, supra note 26.
161 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 104.
162 Id. The Czechoslovakian law was the Act on Protection of Economic Competition,
No. 63 of 1991 (January 30, 1991), reprinted in 13 BuLL. CZECHOSLOVoAAN L. 73-83 (Dr. Ivo
Dvorak trans.) (Fall 1991) [hereinafter Czechoslovakian Act].
163 IVAN T. BERAND & GY6RGY RANKI, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE
IN THE 19Tm Am 20Tm CENTURIES 312 (1974).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 161.
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dominated the heavy industries and raw materials sectors of the econ-
omy: "95.9 per cent of the iron and metal industries, 83 per cent of
stone and clay, and 100 per cent of coal mining."167 Cartels domi-
nated forty-one percent of total industrial output. Monopolies appear
to have been even stronger in Czechoslovakia. 168
During the communist period in both countries, central planning
and state-ownership replaced private cartels. While Poland favored the
industrial association as a business corporation model for socialist econo-
mies,169 Hungary and Czechoslovakia favored instead the model of the
industrial association as an association of independent enterprises.170 Under
this model, industrial associations were created as service organizations
for independent enterprises. 171 The purposes of the associations were
research on "production and technology, design, short- and long-term
market research, [and] advertising." 72 The most important feature of
such associations was the lack of central administrative power over
member enterprises.' 73 Each enterprise made its own operational de-
cisions in order to meet central output or production requirements.
174
Hungarian and Czechoslovakian economic arrangements func-
tioned in much the same way as they did in Poland. State administra-
tion again gained a dominant role through state ownership of
enterprises, but did not exercise its control from a state "corporate
headquarters" as in Poland. 175 Instead, state control functioned
through target setting and allocation of resources.176 Hungary altered
the course of state ownership starting in 1978 after promulgation of
the "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM). 177 From 1978 to 1988 the
cooperative sector grew, and from 1982 a legal private sector took root
and grew.'78 However, the private sector's impact was significant only
in commerce and some service activities.179 In Czechoslovakia there
was no such reorientation toward a limited private sector and market
economy.' 80 Czechoslovakian economic policy was a model of consis-
tency in terms of programs promoted and target markets.' 8 ' By late
1990, just before passage of the Czechoslovakian law on competition,
167 Id. at 312.
168 Id. Berend and Rfinki do not provide specific data on Czechoslovakia.
169 This model for socialist economies is discussed in part II.A.2., supra.
170 ZIEUNSKI, supra note 77, at 278-79.
171 Id.
172 Id.
17s Id.
174 Id.
175 Mfiton Tardos, How to Create Markets in Eastern Europe: The Hungarian Cas in Eco-
NOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION: ESSAys IN
HONOR OF FRmANLYN D. HozMAN 259, 260-61 Uosef C. Brada et al. eds., 1988).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 263.
180 Id. at 119-21.
181 Id.
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Czechoslovakia had almost no private sector at all.' 8 2
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have taken slightly different ap-
proaches from Poland's to privatization of their economies. Hungary
has attempted a program of "spontaneous privatizations" that "allow[ ]
state enterprises to convert themselves into joint stock companies." 83
Abuses of the process by incumbent managers, such as "selling assets
cheaply to foreign investors.., in return for higher salaries and guar-
anteed jobs," were curbed by a law passed in 1989.184 Hungary
planned to privatize eighty percent of state enterprises between 1989
and 1994.185 Czechoslovakia, before division into the independent
Czech and Slovak Republics, planned to use a three-phase approach:
in the first phase, small concerns were to be sold to private investors,
then offered to the public; in the second phase, large-scale enterprises
were to be privatized by distributing vouchers, which would later be
exchanged for shares, to all Czechoslovakian citizens; in the final
phase, a group of state-run enterprises was to be transformed into joint
stock companies. 8 6
B. Provisions of Hungarian and Czechoslovakian Antitrust Laws
Like the Polish antitrust law, the Hungarian and Czechoslova-
kian' 87 laws are modelled most closely on those of the EC, defining
prohibited restrictive practices, standards for mergers, and defining
and allowing for the dissolution of monopolies and potential monopo-
lies.' 88 Although Hungary had a draft law in 1984, it lacked adequate
provisions to control mergers and to address abuse of dominant mar-
ket position.' 89 Following the EC model, the current Hungarian law
makes some vertical non-price restraints per se illegal, but horizontal
restraints, such as price fixing, are judged under the rule of reason.' 9 0
U.S. law takes the opposite approach.' 9 '
The Hungarian antitrust law has been tempered by an apparent
182 Key Staff at Division, FTC Discuss Changes on Antitrust Enforcement Scene, 59 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 672, 678 (Nov. 8, 1990). Barbara A. Clark, Director of Litigation and
Administration in the Bureau of Competition at the FTC, stated that Czechoslovakia has had
no private sector while describing the FTC's responses to requests to communicate competi-
tion policy to government officials in Eastern European states. Id.
183 Eduardo Borensztein & Manmohan S. Kumar, Proposals for Privatization in Eastern Eu-
rope, 38 IMF STAFF PAPERs 300, 318 (1991).
184 Id.
185 Steiger Finds U.S. Has Responsibility to Help New Markets in Eastern Europe, supra note 29,
at 24.
186 Borensztein & Kumar, supra note 183, at 318.
187 See Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162.
188 The terms of EC antitrust laws are discussed in part I.B., supra.
189 Tougher Competition Laws Are on Agenda for Poland, Hungary, supra note 10, at 573.
190 Steiger Finds U.S. Has Responsibility to Help New Markets in Eastern Europe, supra note 29,
at 24. The observations are those of FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger.
191 Id. The approach of the United States, which makes horizontal restraints per se ille-
gal, but judges vertical restraints under a rule of reason, is described in part I.B., supra.
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contradiction in the form of a new concessions law.192 Concessions, or
the exclusive right to pursue certain highly profitable activities, are
legal for operation of state properties, such as public roads, railways,
canals, harbors, and international airports.193 Similar arrangements
are not unheard of in Western economies.
Perhaps at the urging of American advisors, the Czechoslovakian
Act194 included a provision for private claimants to bring claims
against parties engaged in anticompetitive behavior.195 However, the
provision lacked the incentive feature of treble damages for a victori-
ous claimant found in the U.S. law, allowing only actual damages. 196
Like Poland, both Hungary and Czechoslovakia opted for the
bright line of thirty percent market concentration as separating accept-
able from market-dominating position. 197 In addition, the Czechoslo-
vakian law followed the EC model of differentiating between share in
the largest market (the Federal Republic or the Community, respec-
tively) and the constituent states (Czech and Slovak republics or coun-
tries, respectively). 198 In the Czechoslovakian law, a share smaller than
five percent in the market of a Republic or smaller than thirty percent
of the market regularly supplied by the concern would not have been
subject to scrutiny by the Offices of Economic Competition. 199
Again like Poland, both Hungary and Czechoslovakia drew upon
the EC model of enforcement bodies by creating the Hungarian Cartel
Office, 200 and the Czechoslovakian Offices of Economic Competi-
tion.20' The Czechoslovakian law created three such offices, one each
for the Czech, Slovak, and Federal Republics. 202 The Czechoslovakian
offices, before partition, would likely have encountered the problem of
192 Dr. Maria Winkler, We Are Getting a Law on Concessions Too!, PRrVAT PROFIT, Feb. 1991.
193 Id.
194 This section of the discussion considers the antitrust law as enacted by Czechoslova-
kia before partition. Little information has yet come to light on how the independent Czech
and Slovak Republics will modify their versions of the law. However, it should be noted that
the Czechoslovakian law was designed to accomodate the two republics in a federal fashion.
Presumably, the offices in each of the republics under the federation will now become the
offices of the independent republics.
195 Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Six, § 17. "Anybody whose rights have
been violated by impermissible limitation of competition may demand that the violator desist
from action, correct the irregular state of affairs, provide appropriate satisfaction, compen-
sate damages, and surrender any illegitimate material gain.. . ." Id.
196 Unlike the Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Six, § 17, the United States
antitrust law provides for treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
197 The so-called "two-thirds rule" on Community dimension of the prohibited practice
is found in EC Merger Regulations, art. 12(1), last paragraph. Cook & Soames I, supra note
48.
198 Id.
199 Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Two, § 3(3) (d).
200 Tougher Competition Laws Are on Agenda for Poland, Hungaty, supra note 10, at 574.
201 See Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Three, § 10.
202 The Czechoslovakian antitrust law may survive the partition of the country with its
provisions almost intact, albeit readopted for each republic as a separate entity. The antitrust
law may have been designed for this very contingency: Each republic already has in place its
own Office of Economic Competition. Furthermore, the law may suit one republic as well as
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differing interpretation of the same act by different offices that hap-
pens occasionally among the circuit courts of appeals in the United
States. Rather than spelling disaster for the law, such splits of opinion
might have led quickly to revision of the law itself.
IV. An Assessment of Eastern European Antitrust Laws
This assessment of new laws protecting competition in Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia scrutinizes why the new laws have certain
provisions similar to or different from Western models and why certain
enforcement procedures have been selected in light of the economic
circumstances and structures of the emerging market economies of
Eastern Europe. The assessment is based on the extent to which the
new laws fit with or provide for an appropriate transition from the
planned economy of the communist period, and the extent to which
the new laws fit with Eastern Europe's pre-communist legal culture.
A. The Influence of Legal History and Culture
However much the new antitrust laws of Eastern Europe may re-
semble their Western models, lessons from each country's own legal
history and culture do not seem to have been lost on the drafters. The
enforcement structure in the new law is the clearest example of this.
In its post-communist reincarnation, Poland's Monopolistic Practices
Act seems to have been modelled more closely on the stricter 1935 law
rather than on the 1933 Cartel Law.203 The 1933 Cartel Law required
the Minister of Trade and Industry to act through a Cartel Court, a
process that proved burdensome and simply too slow to address the
growing cartelization problem during the Depression. Like the 1935
law, the modern law sets up a specific agency (the Minister in the 1935
law, the Anti-Monopoly Office in the 1990 Act) with powers to annul
monopolistic practices, restructure enterprises, and impose fines with-
out judicial process. Judicial review by the Anti-Monopoly Tribunal re-
tains some restraint on overzealous administrative decisions, as was
demonstrated by the FSO case above. Hungary and Czechoslovakia
have chosen their own versions of this enforcement office.
Also, the centralized enforcement structure of the new Eastern
European laws sits well with both pre-communist and communist pe-
riod administrative experience. The state-controlled enterprises were
centrally created; likewise, their demise into multiple competitive pri-
vate entities is under central control. As noted above, central control
the other inlight of the continuing relationship between the republics and the probability
that each republic will still desire to integrate its antitrust policy and law with that of the EC.
203 The 1933 and 1935 Cartel Laws were discussed in part IIA.I., supra The provisions
of the new law were discussed in part III.B., supra. Citations to these laws are omitted from
the present comparison.
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of the economy was also a principal feature of independent Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia between the wars.
Although it may appear paradoxical, central control of decentrali-
zation of the economy also fits with Eastern Europe's legal history and
culture. After almost a century of central control by state monopolies,
quasi-state sanctioned monopolies, and private monopolies, these
countries have little experience with the efficient operation of a mar-
ket economy. Chaos, in the form of extreme inflation and unemploy-
ment, would be the inevitable result of an uncontrolled re-entry into
market competition. Eastern European industries are likely accus-
tomed to adhering to central policy edicts, so the direction set by cen-
tral planners of the privatization process will be greeted with greater
tolerance than would excessive central intervention in Western
markets.
Some failures of the communist period also inform present East-
ern European antitrust law. The combination of administratively cre-
ated monopolies and government price controls during the
communist period was unsuccessful as a remedy to anticompetitive be-
havior.20 4 That failure may be part of the reason the Polish AMO and
its counterparts now shy away from price controls as anything but a
temporary and limited solution to monopolistic behavior. 20 5
Eastern Europe has extensively transplanted policies and regula-
tions from Western antitrust law, however. More time is needed to see
whether such transplantations will be fruitful in the transition to a mar-
ket economy in Eastern Europe. All three countries examined
adopted the bright line of a thirty percent market share as the defini-
tion of market dominance. However, that level of concentration, often
adjusted for different market sectors, has become a determinative fac-
tor in American antitrust law only through a continuing process of ju-
dicial examination, with harsh results tempered by the "rule of reason"
that guides so much of modern American antitrust enforcement. 206
The economic circumstances of Poland, however, may require much
different criteria and yardsticks of concentration. The Poles seem to
have recognized the importance of analyzing antitrust problems in
light of the rule of reason rather than per se conclusions.207 The FSO
case is an example of rebalancing a per se conclusion in light of rele-
vant economic circumstances, as will be considered below.
204 ZIELINSKI, supra note 77, at 282-83.
205 The FSO price control fiasco is doubtless another reason.
206 For a discussion of the development of the thirty percent market share test in the
United States, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
207 There is a growing sophistication in both the application of antitrust concepts and
antitrust jargon among Polish government officials and commentators. See, e.g.,
Wieczorkiewicz, supra note 124 (referring to "barriers to entry" and "rule of reason," which
are quite new in Polish comments on monopolistic practices and approaches to
enforcement).
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B. The Effectiveness of the Law for a Market in Transition
However well the new laws may fit with Eastern European legal
history and culture, their real value will be in how well they facilitate
the transition to and maintenance of a competitive market economy.
Here, there are disquieting signs suggesting that further amendment
and fine-tuning of the laws will be necessary.
The president of the Polish AMO has already recognized that a
basic imperfection of the law under which the AMO operates is that it
"was drawn up for a market economy." The law identifies some "out-
lawed monopolist practices, but there are many more" not mentioned
that are becoming apparent in Polish conditions.20 8 Worse yet, behav-
ior that on its surface would attract the attention of any Western anti-
trust enforcement official may not be the result of monopolistic
behavior in Eastern Europe's economic circumstances. Eastern Eu-
rope's monopolists, such as FSO in Poland,
do not attempt classic monopolist tactics. Their financial calculations
always show that they are working only on the verge of profitability, or
that they even engage in unpaid work, so that there is a deficit. They
raise prices because of increased costs, which go up because the enter-
prises are inefficient. [Furthermore], a recession always means in-
creased costs.
2 0 9
Because Eastern European economies are in transition to market
competition, the orientation of their enforcement agencies must be
somewhat different from that of Western antimonopoly agencies,
which primarily guard against the emergence of monopolies. The eco-
nomic and social circumstances of Eastern Europe necessitate an over-
riding concern with termination of monopolies by removing barriers to
entry and fostering competition.2 10 As noted above, this is exactly what
the Polish AMO is striving to do. Fortunately, the Polish government is
continuing to watch and amend the Monopolistic Practices Act as the
transition from centrally controlled economy to market economy un-
folds in Poland.2 11
Despite doctrinaire assertions that its role is to regulate competi-
tion not to protect other public interests, 21 2 the Polish AMO has taken
208 Cydejko, supra note 26.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See, e.g., War on Monopoly, supra note 114 (discussing adjustments and amendments to
the law after only one year in operation).
212 'The Anti-Trust Office represents the interests of the competition, and not the
public interest,' Anna Fornalczyk, head of the Anti-Trust Office, said briefing
the members of the Sejm Economic System and Industry Commission on the
Office's activities. According to the information which she provided, the Office
not only prevented monopolist practices, but it also 'kept an eye' on structural
changes in the economy. It turns out that privatisation of an enterprise often
involves replacing a state monopoly with a private one.
Antitrust Office on Monopolies, ZYcIE WAszAWY No. 35, Feb. 11, 1993, at 11, reprinted in PousH
NEws Buu., Feb. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
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on a special role in the everyday economic life of the country. It has
become a watchdog over prices of goods and services in the country
and must analyze every change in the business climate to ensure that
Polish consumers do not suffer unduly during the transition to a mar-
ket economy.213 It has encountered stiff opposition from the courts,
however, when it has attempted to prevent price increases.2 14 A simi-
lar public interest role for the Hungarian and Czech antitrust regula-
tors is also developing.215
213 In July, "the Anti-Trust Office entered Telekomunikacja Polska in the register of mo-
nopolists. This means that the company will need an approval of the Ministry of Finance
every time it wants to increase its prices." Telephone Charge Raise Protested, GAZETA WYBORCZA
No. 164,July 16, 1993, at 1, reprinted in PousH NEws BuLL, July 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, PNBUL File. Price changes that place consumers at a disadvantage will have
to be justified by business requirements, according to Ryszard Hoffmanan, AMO spokesman,
who said, "There are many irregularities related to the functioning of Telekomunikacja Pol-
ska. The latest hike was the straw that broke the camel's back. We are going to ask
Telekomunikacja Polska to submit a justification of the telephone charge increase together
with the calculations." Id.
There are other examples of the public interests the Polish AMO is called upon to pro-
tect. It has been called upon to control the costs of imported food to protect consumers.
Import Surcharges and Food Prices, RzEczposPoLrrA No. 70, Mar. 24, 1993, at 1, reprinted in Po-
LISH NEwS BuL., Mar. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
'The growth of food prices will be minimal if, as we have projected, only if the
following two conditions are fulfilled: first, the Anti-Trust Office must prevent
profiteering practices on the part of importers, and, secondly, there cannot be
an uncontrolled export of large quantities of food causing shortages in the
market,' Uozef] Niemczyk[director of the Foreign Economic Relations Depart-
ment in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture] said. 'Of course, in a market
economy, it is difficult to forbid anyone to sell agriculture produce abroad,
particularly when it is encouraged by the financial system, as it is the case in
Poland. By exporting the produce right after the harvest, one may avoid the
need to take expensive loans to store the products. On the other hand, later,
when the products are imported, attempts are made to sell them at the highest
possible prices in the Polish market. In other words, the point would be to
regulate the export of food.'
Id.
The AMO has also taken an active role in attempting to control the price of coal and
protecting the welfare of coalminers made unemployed by changes in the industry. Anti-
Trust Office Accepts Coal Concerns, RZECZPOSPOLrTA No. 72, Mar. 26, 1993, at 1, reprinted in
POUSH NEws BuLL., Mar. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File.
The process of registration of coal concerns and holdings have finally begun as
the Anti-Trust Office ultimately gave its consent to the restructuring of the
hard coal industry.... Earlier, the Office had withheld its go ahead until the
Ministry of Industry and Trade guaranteed that the reform would not make the
monopoly on mining more taxing. The Office demanded also a welfare pro-
gramme for the 20,000 miners to be made redundant [sic]. Although the minis-
try had not complied with the Office's requirements, the latter approved of the
changes, on several conditions, though. The Office warns that it is going to
monitor the reform in mining. It will pay particular attention to changes in
coal prices, to the market position of the new companies and to the effect of
the winding up of eleven mines on the production costs in others.
Id.
214 So far, the Anti-Monopoly Office has not managed to win before the Court any of the
cases involving significant price increases. Telephone Charge Raise Protested, supra note 213.
215 The publishers of Hungary's budding free press industry "hope[ ] to challenge the
monopoly of the postal service by taking their case before Hungary's anti-trust tribunal, the
Versenyhivatal." Attila Jahasz, Raising Prices In Hungay: Quality vs. Quantity, THE WAgSAw
VOICE, May 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WRSAWV File.
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The drafters of Eastern Europe's antitrust laws had to keep in
mind the larger market into which they hoped to become integrated.
Hungary has done that successfully. One intriguing difference be-
tween the Hungarian law and U.S. law is in the application of rules of
per se illegality and rules of reason. The Hungarian law appears to
make some vertical non-price restraints per se illegal, while horizontal
restraints, such as price fixing, are judged under the rule of reason.
This follows the EC antitrust law. The United States takes the opposite
approach, by analyzing most vertical restraints under the rule of reason
and price fixing as illegal per se. In such a different climate, one com-
mentator suggests, American franchises that may be efficient could be
discouraged from locating in Hungary. 216 Hungary, however, is pri-
marily interested in integration with the Common Market. 217 Price fix-
ing may be a necessary measure to protect Hungarian industry from
collapse under the weight of unchecked inflation during the transition
phase. In any event, in a country that has had centrally controlled
prices for decades price fixing does not have the stigma it would have
in the United States.
It has yet to be seen whether Czechoslovakia's adoption of the
American-style private claimant provision 218 will fit into the privatiza-
tion process and future market economy of the independent republics.
American antitrust specialists pushed such provisions, noting that pri-
vate suits outnumbered agency suits ten to one in the United States.
The advisors also suggested that the prospect of treble damages for
victorious private claimants was an essential incentive. 219 Although
"The government of the Czech Republic... has ordered an antitrust investigation of
meat producers and imposed price controls on pork to combat 'unwarranted price in-
creases'" during the last few months of 1992. Czech Government Will Investigate Price Increases by
Meat Producers, Int'l Bus. Daily (BNA) (Dec. 14, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BNAIBD File.
Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik, in announcing the measures at a press conference, indi-
cated that the government would take the same steps against other agricultural commodities
in similar circumstances. "We've been following the irresponsible behavior of the industry
with a growing disquiet," he noted. "We hope the measures we are announcing today will
have educational effect on the entire industry." Skyrocketing meat prices were largely re-
sponsible for a 2% monthly increase in the consumer price index during September and
October, rekindling government fears of increased inflation. Id.
Czech Deputy Competition Minister Pavel Soukal told BNA that, although the antitrust
investigation is only beginning, "there is a substantial reason to believe the industry has en-
tered into a cartel agreement" to fix prices. Id.
He explained that the maximum penalty for violation of the Czech Competition Law is
5% of turnover. In this case, he said, the penalty could exceed $1 million. Id.
216 Steiger Finds U.S. Has Responsibility to Help New Markets in Eastern Europe, supra note 29,
at 24. The observations are those of FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger.
217 Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, supra note 1,
at 115. See also EC Antitrust Rules Incorporated into Eastern Cooperation Agreements, 61 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1544, at 686 (Dec. 5, 1991).
218 Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Six, § 17, as discussed in note 195
sup_
219 America's Antitrust Diaspora; Trustbusters, Inc., THE ECONOMIsT, Nov. 9, 1991, at 84.
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Czechoslovakia opted for private suits, it did not adopt any provision
for treble damages, only actual damages.2 20 Private suits may be useful
tools in the regulatory arsenal to prevent attempts to monopolize, but
it is uncertain how they will work in a market trying to.demonopolize.
Actual damages may prove an insufficient incentive for new firms to
engage in litigation. On the other hand, paying treble damages might
exceed the financial capacity of fledgling private enterprises however
big they are, because they are likely operating only just above operat-
ing costs. A potential monopolist bankrupted by a treble damages pay-
out may not be a great loss to a reasonably competitive market like that
of the United States, but the loss of an essential industrial enterprise in
Czechoslovakia's more concentrated market could be disastrous in
light of already uncertain economic circumstances.
The Czech Republic is also considering American-style criminal
sanctions for antitrust violations. Leos Oliva, Second Deputy Minister
for Competition in the Czech Republic, commented in an interview in
late December 1992, on the eve of partition, that he would seek legisla-
tive authority to impose criminal penalties on violators.221 Criminal
sanctions are but one of the Czech Republic's continuing efforts to
conform its antitrust law to the special circumstances of the country.
Officials hope to amend the law (1) so that professional organizations
and associations will come under its price and monopoly controls, (2)
so that regulators can control vertical cartels currently outside the reg-
ulatory reach of the law, and (3) to grant the ministry the authority to
break up mergers that provide the amalgamated concern with a mo-
nopolistic dominant position in the market, rather than simply grant-
ing it the authority to approve such mergers as the current law does.222
V. Conclusion
Eastern Europe's emerging free market countries have received
several forms of Western assistance in the formulation of their compe-
tition laws. The assistance of the United States took the form of joint
seminars, exchange of experts, and financial assistance for aid in devel-
opment of policy. Similar assistance has been offered by EC experts;
however, the principal assistance of the EC has been the availability of
its laws as models for the Eastern Europeans. For example, the lan-
guage of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome appears in the new
law of Poland. Hungary has adopted the EC's application of per se
rules and the rule of reason for horizontal and vertical restraints,
although these rules are applied in the opposite way in the United
220 Czechoslovakian Act, supra note 162, Division Six, § 17(1).
221 "Only when you send someone to jail will you make your presence felt." C.S.F.A
Federal Competition Law Failing to Break Up Monopolies, OffciaLs Say, Int'l Bus. Daily (BNA) (Dec.
29, 1992) (comments of Oliva), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIBD File.
222 Id.
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States. In addition, each of the countries examined has chosen as its
enforcement agency an anti-monopoly office similar to the EC Monop-
olies Commission. The model in the United States is a tripartite one
involving the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the FTC,
and private litigants pursuing separate means of enforcement. This
choice of the EC rather than American model may be in large part due
to the goal of Eastern European nations to seek integration into the
Common Market.
Despite the choice of EC models for the language of most provi-
sions, various criteria and enforcement methods have been borrowed
from the United States. Each of the three countries studied has cho-
sen the U.S. standard for market concentration indicative of monopo-
list activity, which is thirty percent, over the more fluid standard of the
EC, which uses forty percent as a rule of thumb. Each country has
taken the level of market concentration as a bright line limit, rather
than as a factor in the analysis as it is in the United States and the EC.
Also, Czechoslovakia originally adopted the U.S. model of private suits
to vindicate rights against monopolists, albeit with only actual damages
rather than treble damages as the incentive. These provisions of the
Czechoslovakian law are likely to survive partition of the country.
The centralized approach to demonopolization fits with the legal
culture of each country because it fits with the centralized approach to
the economy dominant during the communist and pre-communist pe-
riods. The extent to which the antitrust laws of the emerging free mar-
kets will provide a smooth transition to market competition, however,
is not clear. Eastern Europe is encountering a different set of monop-
olistic practices in a far different set of economic circumstances from
what the West has ever encountered. The context in which the laws
must operate is thus quite different. Eastern Europe needs to elimi-
nate monopolies, while the current aim in the West is to prevent mo-
nopolies from forming. The countries of Eastern Europe are
discovering the impact of these differences. Although the most recent
developments suggest that the antitrust regulators of Eastern Europe
are developing a special role in price control andother activities in the
public interest, the question that remains unanswered is whether or
not Eastern European countries will fashion original and effective solu-
tions to their unique problems of protecting and fostering economic
competition.
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